

chaperone contracts for higher-order sessions

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sessions and session types



$!int.!int.?int$

$?int.?int.!int$

- ▶ **session** = private communication channel with 2 endpoints
- ▶ **session type** = protocol specification as a type (\approx FSA)

pairing session types with contracts

Motivation

- ▶ finding more bugs and making it easier to locate their cause

`!int.!int.?int`

- 1 send any number
- 2 send a number $n \neq 0$
- 3 receive a number $m > 0$

sessions as **non-uniform** mutable objects

Contracts for higher-order functions and mutable objects

- ▶ Findler & Felleisen, ICFP 2002
- ▶ Strickland, Tobin-Hochstadt, Findler & Flatt, OOPSLA 2012

higher-order functions \iff higher-order sessions
 put and **get** \iff **send** and **recv**

Differences

- ▶ **order** of operations **constrained** by the session type
- ▶ **type** of messages **may change** over time
- ▶ **contract** of messages **may change** over time

a model of functions, sessions and contracts

functional core	$\left[\begin{array}{l} x \\ \lambda x. e \\ e_1 e_2 \end{array} \right]$
threads and sessions [Gay & Vasconcelos, JFP 2010]	$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{send} \\ \text{recv} \\ \dots \end{array} \right]$
monitors and blames [Findler & Felleisen, ICFP 2002]	$\left[\begin{array}{l} [e]^{c,p,q} \\ \text{blame } p \end{array} \right]$
contracts for sessions [this work]	$\left[\begin{array}{l} \text{send_c } c \ d \\ \text{recv_c } c \ d \\ \dots \end{array} \right]$

sample contract

!int.!int.?int

- 1 send any number
- 2 send a number $n \neq 0$
- 3 receive a number $m \geq 0$

```
send_c  
  any_c  
  (send_c  
    (flat_c ( $\neq$  0))  
    (recv_c  
      (flat_c ( $\geq$  0))  
      end_c))
```

sample contract

`!int.!int.?int`



- 1 send any number
- 2 send a number $n \neq 0$
- 3 receive a number $m \geq 0$



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send_c
  any_c
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      end_c))
```


sample program

```
let    a = connect server in          a : !int.!int.?int
let    a = send 1234 a in             a : !int.?int
let    a = send 56 a in              a : ?int
let m, a = recv a in                 a : end
...

```


Communication primitives always return the endpoint being used

- ▶ the **type** of the endpoint is updated at each rebinding
- ▶ the **contract** of the endpoint can be updated as well!


first-order monitored output

`send m [a]` ^{`send_c c d,p,q`} `||` `recv a`


first-order monitored output



first-order monitored output




first-order monitored output




higher-order monitored output

`send b [a] send_c c d,p,q || recv a`


higher-order monitored output



higher-order monitored output



who gets the blame?



- ▶ q sends b to p
- ▶ p **thinks** that it is safe to send **any** number, e.g. -1 , on b
- ▶ r **expects** to receive a positive number from p
- ▶ by the time the violation is detected, q is no longer involved

honest modules won't be blamed

Local compliance \Rightarrow Global blame freedom

If p complies with the contracts it **knows**, then no one will blame p

It's difficult to formalize what "knowing a contract" means

- ▶ contracts are decomposed and turned inside out
- ▶ not all endpoints have a contract
- ▶ ...

We prove the result using an alternative semantics

- ▶ makes it easy to identify syntactically the contracts known by p
- ▶ we show that the two semantics are **essentially** equivalent

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Local compliance \Rightarrow Global blame freedom


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- ▶ modular design, portable to other session libraries

summary

Contributions

- ▶ monitoring system for sessions with dynamic contract update
- ▶ blame correctness

Other features

- ▶ **dependent** contracts
- ▶ contracts for **recursive** and **branching** protocols

Open issues

- ▶ functions in messages cannot carry session endpoints
- ▶ ...

THANKS!